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Palmerlee: Oil and Gas - Damages - Voluntary Unitization - Liability of Oper
OIL AND GAS-Damages-Voluntary Unitization-Liability of Operator of
Waterflood Project to Non-Joiner. Baumgartner v. Gulf Oil Corporation
184 Neb. 384, 168 N.W.2d 510 (1969).

Defendant was the operator of a state approved' unitization project formed to increase the ultimate recovery of oil and
to prevent waste. The unit agreement, which provided for
secondary recovery of oil by waterflooding was signed by all
of the working interest owners in the field except the plaintiff
who was offered a fair and equitable opportunity to join.
Upon plaintiff's refusal to participate, his section was excluded from the unit and waterflooding was initiated. Plaintiff's action was in trespass and conversion for value of oil
swept from under plaintiff's lease by defendants waterflooding project.
The evidence clearly indicated that the plaintiff could
not have profitably developed his lease to recover the small
amount of primarily recoverable oil that underlay his lease
and that in the absence of waterflooding by defendant, no
secondary oil could have been recovered by plaintiff. Had
plaintiff joined the project and borne his share of the costs,
his profit would have been $27,455.00. Had he drilled independently (a drilling permit was denied by the commission because plaintiff was able but refused to join the unit) 2 and
taken advantage of the waterflooding, the highest estimate of
his profit would be $12,224. The trial court applied the common law of willful trespass and entered judgment against
defendant for the value of the oil drained from under plaintiff's lease without deduction of any development or operating costs ($89,933.00).
In reversing, the Supreme Court of Nebraska held that
where a secondary recovery project has been authorized by the
commission, the operator is not liable for willful trespass to
Copyright @ 1971 by the University of Wyoming

1. The Nebraska Oil and Gas Commission approved the project under a superceded voluntary unitization statute (Session Laws of Nebraska, § 57-910,
repealed) which has since been revised to provide for compulsory unitization
(REv. STAT. OF NEB. § 57-910).

2.

The decision was later reversed but not until the recoverable oil was swept
from beneath plaintiff's lease. This raises the question, outside the scope
of this note, of whether plaintiff would have a cause of action against the
commission for denying his drilling permit because he chose not to participate in the unitization. The statute in effect was a voluntary unitization
statute and seemingly would not warrant denial of a drilling permit for
failure to participate in a unitization project. See generally 6 WILLIAMS &
MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 933 (1964).
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owners who refused to join the propect when the injected
recovery substance moves across lease lines, but rather is
liable only for the profit the non-joiner could have realized
"had he drilled, developed and operated his property outside
the unitization project; that is, as if no unitization had occurred. ' Though this rule generates an acceptable result
based on the particular facts in this case, as a general measure
of damages for cases having the same dominant features,4 it
is inadequate. This inadequacy stems from its failure to
always promote the public policy it was designed to support
and the inequitable awards that could arise from it. A better
measure, consonant both with equity and public policy, is the
common law measure for unintentional trespass and conversion.
The context out of which this case arises is one in which
public policy favoring maximum ultimate recovery of oil competes with the traditional concept of private ownership and
use of property. ristorically, under the rule of capture, surface interest holders were entitled to whatever oil they could
produce by primary recovery operations conducted on their
own land. But primary recovery operations were able to recover only a small part of the oil actually in place, so secondary recovery methods evolved by which controlled injection
of water or gas into an oil pool created sufficient pressure to
permit recovery of additional oil. Unfortunately, the forces
generated by secondary recovery methods didn't respect lease
lines, and oil could be swept from under the property of one
not participating in the secondary recovery effort. As a result, the owners of separate interests in a common reservoir
voluntarily joined together to share the costs and proceeds
from secondary recovery projects. The effect was substantially increased recovery at a lesser cost. The problem arises,
as in Baumgartner,when one of the persons holding an in3. Baumgartner v. Gulf Oil Corp. 184 Neb. 384, 168 N.W.2d 510, 519 (1969).
4. The dominant features are:
(a) a voluntary unitization project
(b) approved by the appropriate commission
(c) for secondary recovery using some method requiring injection of
foreign substance, e.g. water or gas
(d) which the plaintiff non-joiner had a fair opportunity to join
(e) that was operated without negligence
(f) and which resulted in a reduction in the amount of oil in place
beneath plaintiff's lease.
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terest in the common reservoir refuses to join the project but
will be affected by the forces it sets in motion. Though seemingly a private conflict, this problem is in fact a conflict between public policy and private rights.
Were the question merely a conflict of private interests,
the courts would undoubtedly have settled the question of liability under the traditional common law rule of intentional
trespass and conversion and the measure of damages would
have followed automatically. That there was a physical trespass set in motion by the waterflood operator and that the
invasion was intentional is beyond dispute. In the absence
of some contrary public policy, the result is apparent: liability
for intentional trespass and damages measured by the value
of the mineral converted with no deduction of production costs.
The introduction of the policy factor by oil and gas conservation legislation favoring maximum ultimate recovery made
this result unacceptable; the courts were obliged to re-examine
the question of liability in light of this policy. The re-examination led some courts to completely deny liability by: restricting the effective definition of trespass ;' holding that approval
by the appropriate state agency precludes liability ;' holding
that having refused a fair opportunity to join, any damage
would be "damnum absque injuria."' Another court, though
still finding liability, based it on a theory with a less severe
impact than that of willful trespass.' But the questions of liability is beyond the scope of this note9 which is directed toward
evaluating the impact of the measure of damages on the policy
goals to be effected.
Due to the ever-increasing demand for petroleum products, public policy dictates that maximum efficient recovery
of oil be promoted and, therefore, that secondary recovery
projects be encouraged. State legislatures have generally en5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

California Co. v. Britt, 147 Miss. 718, 154 So.2d 144 (1963).
Railroad Comm. of Tex. v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1962).
Tide Water Assoc. Oil Co. v. Stott, 169 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1946).
Tidewater Oil Co. v. Jackson, 320 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1963).
See generally : Tort liability in Waterflood Operations, 5 ALBERTA L. R. 52
(1966); Keeton & Jones Tort liability and the Oil and Gas Industry II,
39 TEx. L.R. 253; Methvin Secondary Recovery Operations: Rights of the
Non Joiner 42 TEx. L.R. 364; Driscoll Secondary Recovery of Oil & Gas:
Significance of Agency Approval, 13 KAN. L.R. 481; Oil & Gas: Rights &

Liabilities Incident to Water Flood Operations, 17 OKLA. L.R. 457; Kelly
Trespass in Secondary Recovery, 17 S.W.L.J. 591.
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dorsed this policy and indicated through the various oil and
gas conservation acts that this public need will prevail over
conflicting private rights-but only to the extent necessary
to provide for this public need. Many states have expressly
recognized this balancing of interest by adopting the policy
statement of the Model Oil and Gas Conservation Act: "It is
hereby declared to be in the public interest to foster ... the
greatest ultimate recovery of oil ... and that correlative rights

of all owners be fully protected,"'" whereas other states have
only impliedly recognized it in other provisions within their
statutes. For example, the Wyoming statute" which provides
for the establishment of drilling units (to prevent waste in
accordance with public policy) recognizes the need for protection of correlative rights (to minimize the infringement on
private rights). Since the legislative intent is clear that public policy will prevail, the problem is not one of balancing
public and private interests to see which will prevail, but
rather one of discovering the rule that will provide for this
public need with the least infringement on competing private
rights. Some states have solved this problem by passing compulsory unitization statutes. 1" The Baumgartner case arose
in a state that left the problem to the courts. It is suggested
that the court failed to select from the alternatives available
to and discussed by it, the measure of damages best meeting
the standard of promoting maximum recovery with the least
infringement on private rights.
The trial court decision and the dissenting opinion of the
Supreme Court decision represent the two extreme alternatives available to the court. Considering first the trial court
holding of liability based on common law willful trespass, it
obviously overcompensates in favor of private interests and
would substantially inhibit increased secondary recovery
through unitization. As to any particular owner who had
a minor interest in a pool, it would be to his advantage to re10. FLA. STAT. ANNOT. § 377.06 (1968).
S. D. CoMP.LAWS § 45-9-1 (1967).
REV. STAT. OF NEB. § 57-901 (1959).
OKLA. STAT. ANNOT. § 286.1 (1951).
TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. § 6008, Sec. 1 (1969).
11. Wyo. STAT. § 30-221 (1957).
12. The following states have adopted some form of compulsory unitization:
Ala., Alas., Ark., Cal., Colo., Fla., Ga., Kan., La., Mich., Miss., Neb., Nev.,
N.Y., N.D., Ohio, Okla., Ore., Wash.
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fuse to join a unitization project proposed by the major
operators. Were he to join, he would have to pay his share of
the costs, whereas under the trial court rule, he could sue for
the value of the oil displaced or drained without deduction of
any costs. Baumgartner exemplifies the inequity of such a
rule. Though plaintiff's fair share was admittedly only $27,455.00, his recovery under this rule was $89,333.00. Facing
this type of liability, the major operators would be reluctant
indeed to initiate any waterflooding without the consent of
all the interested parties.
Conversely, the Supreme Court dissent would dismiss
the complaint disallowing any recovery for plaintiff's loss of
oil. As viewed by the dissent, the private right to be protected
was merely the plaintiff's correlative right to a fair and equitable opportunity to recover the oil beneath his lease. This
the dissent considered was satisfied by a reasonable offer to
participate in the unitization project. Having thus met their
duty to the plaintiff, the defendants could proceed with impunity, because in the absence of a breach of duty, there is no
liability. The logic of this view is appealing, particularly
when colored by the suspicion that plaintiff's motive for not
joining was less than commendable."3 He apparently was holding out in an attempt to coerce the other operators into allowing him to participate in the project without sharing in the
costs." However appealing, this approach not only shortchanges the doctrine of correlative rights, but is substantially
more severe than is necessary to promote unitization. It is
sufficient that the operators realize a fair return on their
investment, not an unwarranted bonus at the expense of an
adjacent non-joiner. Neither of the extremes-no liability or
maximum liability-stacks up well against the standard of
effective promotion of secondary recovery with the least possible infringement on private property interests.
The majority opinion fares better under this standard as
applied to the specific facts of Baumgartner. It compensates
13. The plaintiff's motive for not joining the unitization project is not relevant
to the rule of damages arrived at by the court. The objective is not to
punish the non-joiner for legitimately exercising his right to refrain from
participating, but rather to compensate him for a loss of property to the
extent that such compensation does not have a deleterious effect on the
promotion of unitization projects.
14. Baumgartner v. Gulf Oil Corp., 184 Neb. 384, 168 N.W.2d 510, 513 (1969).
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to a degree the non-joiner for his loss of oil and also gives the
unit operators a fair return on their project. However, it
does not fare so well when treated as a general rule to be applied to other fact situations. In the language of the court,
the measure is "the amount he could have recovered had he
drilled, developed, and operated his property outside the unitization project."' 5 Though somewhat ambiguous, the fact
that the court put a ceiling on the amount recoverable ($12,224.00) equal to the amount of profit plaintiff could have
made had he drilled independently and taken advantage of the
waterflooding seems to mean that the amount of plaintiff's
damage under this rule might well be a function of how effectively he could exploit the waterflooding of the defendants.
Though in this case, the result is fairly reasonable, the situation is easily imagined in which the amount of recovery could
substantially exceed the value of the oil actually beneath the
non-joiner's land, or conversely, the recovery could be nothing,
though the non-joiner actually had oil drained from beneath
his land (a possibility in this case). The problem with the
majority rule is that the amount of recovery is not proportionate to the property converted and consequently can vary
independently of the loss to plaintiff or gain by the defendant.
At one extreme under this rule, the prospect of liability to a
non-joiner could virtually prohibit a waterflood operation and
have an effect directly opposite to that dictated by public
policy. At the other extreme, a non-joiner could be deprived
of a substantial quantity of oil yet recover nothing, an unnecessary infringement on private rights. This rule, then,
though producing a fairly equitable result in the instant case,
fails in its broad application.
The fourth alternative was dismissed by the court in a
single sentence, 6 even though upon careful examination it
seems to best meet the criterion of promoting secondary recovery with a minimum infringement on private rights. The
alternative dismissed is essentially the common law rule for
unintentional trespass and conversion: the value of the mineral converted less the applicable production and development
15. Id., 519.
16. Id., 512.
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costs. It is also the equivalent of the non-joiner's share had
he joined the unit.
As to infringement on private property rights under this
rule, it is minimal. The land owner gets no bonus at the expense of the unit operators, but is fully compensated for the
loss of oil beneath his land. Only to the extent that the nonjoiner is deprived of the opportunity to decide when (or if)
to convert his mineral asset to a cash asset is he actually injured. He suffers no economic loss and is likely, due to the
economies of unitization, to realize an economic gain. Such a
gain would have been realized by the plaintiff in Baumgartner
had this measure been used. The evidence showed that his
profit, had he joined, would have been $27,455.00, whereas the
maximum he could have recovered through his own efforts
was $12,224.00.
The effect on unitization and secondary recovery is also
entirely satisfactory; it promotes such projects to the extent
that it doesn't discourage them. This should be sufficient if
the project is in fact economically sound. The initial incentive
for proposing the secondary recovery project, substantially
increased recovery and the resultant profit, is unimpaired by
the prospect of liability to a non-joiner. Whether or not he
decides to participate, the expected return on the project and
the resultant inducement to proceed is the same; the measure
of damages is the equivalent of the non-joiner's share had he
participated. If this inducement is not sufficient, then the
project is probably not economically sound and better discouraged than encouraged. It is bardly sound public policy
to encourage marginal endeavors. The court explicitly rejected
this rule on the basis that the non-joiner should not share
equally in the profits of the waterflood project, since he chose
not to share also in the risks. Through a valid criticism, it is
not significant enough to justify scrapping the rule in favor of
of one of those previously discussed. In fact, the non-joiner
does share to a degree in the risk, in that if the common pool
itself is damaged by the waterflood operation, he shares in
this damage to the extent of his interest in the pool. As to
the risk of a net loss, considering that the actual risk of a substantial net loss is low and, that in the event of a net loss, the
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1970
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non-joiner's share would be quite small, it is unlikely that the
inequity of allowing the non-joiner to avoid this risk would
seriously discourage the promoters of a promising unitization
project. 7
In addition to its independent merits, the rule of value
less production costs finds substantial implicit support in the
state oil and gas conservation acts. In those states that do not
have a compulsory unitization statute, support for this rule
is found by analogy to the compulsory pooling provisions.
(Though pooling relates to a cooperative effort within a drilling unit, rather than a reservoir, the dominant characteristics
-a cooperative effort, in the interest of economy, to develop
a commonly held reservoir-are sufficient to support the
analogy.) The Nebraska pooling statute1 8 which was in effect
when Baumgartnerwas decided and which is currently in effect in Wyoming"9 provides that each owner who does not
agree to the pooling is entitled to receive from the operators
his share of the production applicable to his interest less his
share of the cost, the equivalent of the rule under consideration. The rule finds even greater legislative support in the
current Nebraska statute"0 (taken from the model code) which
provides for compulsory unitization; the statute calls for a
"just and equitable distribution of production and costs."
The quantum liability of the operators of a voluntary unitization project to a non-joiner should not be measured by the
profit the non-joiner could have made independently, but
rather by the common law rule of damages for unintentional
trespasses: the value of oil converted less production costs.
Such a rule will adequately promote secondary recovery projects while minimizing infringement on private property
rights.
DAVID F. PALMERLEE

17. Viewed prospectively, suppose the total additional investment is $250,000.00,
the risk of total loss is 10%, and the non-joiner's interest is 4%. The risk that
the non-joiner is avoiding could be valued at 10% of $250,000.00 times 4%
or $1,000.00-hardly sufficient to discourage a promising enterprize.
18. REV. STAT. OF NEB. § 57-909 (1959).
19. WYO. STAT. § 30-221(g) (1957).
20. REv. STAT. OF NEB. § 57-910 (1959).
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